

U.S. STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

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GOAL

WE SHOULD PUSH WITH ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO  
ESTABLISH AN IRREFUTABLE STRATEGIC POSITION THAT  
WILL LAST FROM NOW UNTIL AT LEAST THE YEAR 2000.

"The Need is Great  
The Time is Late  
Our Cause is Just  
Forward we must Thrust"

Dr. George Roche  
May 23, 1983

"As our case is new,  
so must we think anew  
and act anew"

Abraham Lincoln

REFLECTIONS

Looking back over the last thirty-five years or so, many Americans sense that despite enormous advantages and effort, our nation had not done too well in creating the kind of global environment we all wished to see. The principal reason for this is that we as a nation did not think strategically and therefore did not employ the critical element that would enable us to obtain better results from our efforts.

It is to our advantage as a nation to more fully understand strategy as it applies on a global scale; both as a way to comprehend what those hostile to us are doing and to understand what we must do. Our lack of a sense for strategy deprives us of a positive and attractive theme and related actions that increase our standing in the eyes of the people and governments of the world.

There is such a thing known as strategy. It is an orientation in thinking that guides the employment of resources, whether in political, economic or military fields of endeavor, as a way to achieve goals in a competitive environment. The use of strategy in the American business world is illustrated in the recent book entitled: In Search of Excellence.

There is such a thing as a global strategy. It is a strategy which a nation adopts as a guide to its international

policies as a way to achieve its global goals on its own terms. A global strategy is applicable only to those nation's that have responsibilities or intentions that are global in scope. We Americans have tended to think in terms of isolated policies instead of an overall strategy. We have not fully realized other nations used the strategic method of thinking as a way of guiding their policies. A sound global strategy should be thought of as one that combines political, economic, social, military, psychological and moral factors in such a way they related to and support each other. Too often in the past we have relied principally on military means in the world without lasting positive effect.

For a nation to employ a global strategy in a meaningful way, it requires strategic leadership either by an individual or group that practices the art of designing, initiating, directing, adjusting and sustaining strategy. This requires a strategic orientation that involves a basic thinking process about strategy; what strategy is, what is its function, what is its effectiveness, what concepts underlie it, what structure is needed to implement it, and how strategy meets its internal and external challenges.

For the strategic leadership of a nation to be effective, it must be supported by a strategic structure that is the organizational means through which strategic leadership

implements its strategy. This strategic structure must be composed of individuals who not only have a common strategic orientation, but a clear understanding of strategies used by nations in the past so that they have what might be termed a common strategic frame of reference with which to guide them in the future. This team approach involves a shared outlook and language as the basis for a consensus on strategic affairs.

While there is strategic thinking in the United States today, and strategic concepts abroad, there has been difficulty in attaining agreement on key aspects. Many of the strategic ideas that are afloat are inconsistent with one another and therefore do not form a coherent body that could comprise anything like a U.S. global strategy. Without a clear and coherent global strategy as a guide, the allocation of national resources for U.S. international affairs by the budget process tends to be for various programs in support of policies that are not related to a whole. This condition is evident not only within the U.S. Congress but also in the relationship between the Congress and the Executive branch.

It may be time for a complete review of U.S. strategic affairs, beginning with the National Security Act of 1947 and then extending to all amendments and laws that effect

U.S. global behavior. This could be done either by a Presidential commission whose members are appointed on a bipartisan basis or by the creation of a special body in Congress for this purpose. This review process could cover the basic strategic concepts, structure and procedures under which the U.S. government now operates.

The goal of such a review process would be to generate, if at all possible, a consensus on U.S. strategic affairs that would operate much as the former bipartisan foreign policy did in earlier days. It would serve as a way of communicating the need to establish a climate for strategy that is harmonious in nature. This kind of process would provide an opportunity to present a carefully crafted articulation of what U.S. strategy is now, and what it could be with a consensus. For additional justification, refer to a separate paper entitled: "The Case for a Review of U.S. Strategic Affairs."

As a starting point for such a review, the following observations have been prepared as a basis for discussion and elaboration by others who wish to participate in the process.

5/31/83  
RVR

THE STRATEGIC MEMORY CONCEPT

This concept is based on certain world events which occurred over the last thirty-five years or so. It postulates that two general conditions have existed during that time: (1) The National Security Council, authorized by the National Security Act of 1947 as the highest decision-making instrument for U.S. national security affairs, has not had a member that represented an institutional "strategic memory," and (2) A number of events in which the U.S. had an interest that seemed to be isolated events, were in fact interrelated by virtue of hostile forces' use of variations of basic SUN TZU strategy concepts.

A "strategic memory" as used here refers to an institution that has systematically analyzed and catalogued strategies employed by nations and national groups that pursued political goals by a combination of political, military and other means over the last thirty five years or so. This involves what would be essentially a comparison between U.S. and friendly strategies on the one hand and hostile strategies on the other. The primary purpose of a strategic memory is to provide a readily accessible source of such strategic information to the National Security Council for its guidance in applying strategy to current and future situations that effect U.S. national security interests.

The relationship between a "strategic memory" and the National Security Council should be perfectly clear. If strategies have been in play in the world for extended periods of time as we know it has, and we credit SUN TZU's admonition to not only know ourself but know our enemy, which in its true meaning is to infer we should know our own strategy and know the hostile strategy as well, can there be any other more meaningful kind of guidance that the National Security Council could use? The answer should be self-evident.

Some assume the staff of the National Security Council performed the role of a "strategic memory." Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Members of the National Security Council staff have been by custom appointed at the pleasure of the President. But since the Eisenhower Administration, the average term of a Presidential Administration has been slightly over four years. This usually means that the maximum term of service for Individual National Security Council staff members had not exceeded that of the President in office. A recent study by the Congressional Research Service indicates the average term of service for all officials at comparable levels in the U.S. government has been only two and one-half years. It therefore cannot be assumed that any individual or group of individuals who have served on the National Security Council staff have had time to develop and utilize a "strategic memory."

What is the significance of a lack of a "strategic memory" that provides an input directly into the National Security Council? SUN TZU advised that one way to counter a hostile strategy is to publicize it; that is, to make it known to all. If a "strategic memory" is functioning properly, any U.S. President is thus armed with strategic insights that enable him to relate the essence of current hostile strategies in a way that undermines their utility.

Some major events that have occurred over the last thirty-five years in which the U.S. has had its interests at stake can be illustrated by the "case history" method. The first two cases are clear examples of U.S. loss. The third and current one remains doubtful. All three are related in that strategies hostile to U.S. interests were in play. All three are related in that the hostile strategies were essentially a variation of vintage SUN TZU strategy which was either not clearly recognized or not acted upon by U.S. decision-makers at the time.

#### CHINESE CIVIL WAR

This is a case of the U.S. supporting an existing government in the face of a politically oriented military rebellion. The net effect was that the U.S. aided and supported the side which ultimately lost in this particular competition. The central question is: why this outcome?

The Nationalist government, which the U.S. supported in its own interests, had a large army equipped with ample U.S. weapons, supplies, and advisors. It faced a numerically much smaller band of rebels at least during the initial stages.

The rebel forces under the leadership of MAO TSE TUNG conducted a protracted civil war against the Nationalist government. Under that leadership, the rebels avoided action with superior forces and engaged Nationalist forces unexpectedly at the Nationalists' weak points. MAO TSE TUNG retained the initiative most of the time in the choice of when and where to engage the opposition. He not only created conditions which ultimately demoralized the Nationalist army, but which in the meantime won over the peasant population with strict standards of behavior on the part of his forces coupled with superior performance in the field. While this is only a brief sketch of the way it enabled MAO TSE TUNG to prevail over an initially superior opponent, it illustrated the utility of applying SUN TZU's overall concepts to the China of that day.

#### VIETNAM

The significance of the Chinese Civil War lies in the fact that U.S. involvement in Vietnam where it again supported

the side that would lose was almost a repeat performance. The only difference was the direct involvement of U.S. military forces.

Relative to SUN TZU's concepts, we did not know the North Vietnamese or their allies, we did not know the South Vietnamese, and we did not know ourselves. We did not understand the nature of the conflict because we learned no lessons from the Chinese Civil War. We did not fully understand the North Vietnamese strategy of inflicting casualties on American troops as a way to create disharmony in the U.S. and to disorient and discredit our leadership.

We did not seek to defeat the North Vietnamese strategy because we didn't understand what it was. As a result, we employed both military force and negotiations without success. The North Vietnamese had faith in their strategy, knowing that it had previously been successfully employed against the French during the Indo-China War and later by others against the French in Algeria. In effect, the North Vietnamese, from their point of view, were looking at a long track record of success and adapting its lessons which made them difficult to deal with on our terms.

The U.S. disaster in Vietnam became a demonstration, not only to the North Vietnamese that their strategy was a success,

but to their principal ally who in all probability made future global moves on the basis of it.

EL SALVADOR

The outcome of the civil war in El Salvador is not yet a historical fact. The outcome depends on moves to be made by each side in the future. Again, the U.S. in its own perceived interests supports the existing government against an insurgent group. The El Salvadoran government is currently being supplied with U.S. economic aid and military equipment. A plan for regional economic aid has been proposed to prevent the spread of similar type conflicts to nearby nations.

The initial stage of the conflict in El Salvador began in much the same fashion as in South Vietnam and merits attention for that reason. Both situations indicate the difficulties which the U.S. will probably face in similar cases in the future. If the U.S. viewed itself in a leadership role that demanded acceptance of responsibility for situations like Vietnam and El Salvador, its response in the initial stage of El Salvador as in Vietnam can only be described as too late with too little. This means our national decision-making apparatus has not developed a process for bringing these kind of situations under control quickly enough to prevent unfavorable escalation of the conflict. As used here, the national decision-making process refers to the interactions between the Administration and the Congress and the people.

The term "too late with too little" applied to El Salvador as the most recent case, refers to the fact that we in the U.S. tend to underestimate and misperceive the severity of the situation and react in a piecemeal fashion without a complete picture of how the hostile strategy in operation works internally and externally. For that hostile strategy involves not only creating a climate of sympathy in the world for the rebels, it also involves impacting the U.S. decision-making process and creating disharmony in the U.S. It is SUN TZU strategy in action. The term "too late with too little" also refers to the fact that the U.S. displays an inability to support a nation under seige in a way that enables it to cope successfully with the problem.

Bear in mind the fact that virtually no small country in the Third World is immune from an assault by a band of highly organized, disciplined and motivated rebels who have an oligarchically structured government as their target. Whatever that government may justifiably be accused of and whatever its merits, the rebel strategy is to conduct random terrorist acts that provoke government reprisal as the way of enforcing a perception of incompetence and corruption. As soon as the U.S. moves to support the government, psychological guilt by association comes into play and the U.S. also becomes a target.

As the cloud of conflict in El Salvador enveloped the U.S. Congress in the same way it did in Vietnam, the debate over terms and conditions for U.S. aid begins. Some members of Congress see the solution in military aid, others in social and economic aid, and others in a combination of all of them. It is important to note that this kind of debate centers around dollar amounts that the Congress as a whole will agree to. The debate on aid becomes another divisive issue. Although the issue as a whole is a strategic one the actual process for achieving U.S. goals remains unclear to most members of Congress and is lost in the debate over money.

It should be noted that while each of the above three "case histories" cover different conflicts, the fact of the matter is that almost all have as a common thread the interplay of strategy.

### THE COMMAND CENTER CONCEPT

Regardless of how a nation of peoples select their leaders, once chosen those leaders are looked upon by peoples of other nations in terms of the moral authority and power they command. The process for selecting leaders is an internal matter. But relative to global strategic affairs, that portion of a government that deals with the nation's external affairs operates as a command center. In a world environment characterized by change and conflict, this is the only realistic way to look at it.

Those governments that operate to induce change in the world, and those governments that strive to resist change come into conflict with each other in a variety of ways. What develops from this conflict becomes a contest between command centers which in its fundamental sense is a moral contest. The contest is global in scope for the logic of the situation drives each opposing command center to radiate its moral leadership as a means of influencing the maximum number of the world's peoples to be on its side, or at least not oppose it.

Each command center represents control over a finite geographic area and functions in accordance with a specific governing system and a specific system of beliefs and values. The moral contest evolves from the attempt by each command center

to proclaim its own systems as the best and to discredit opposing command centers in the eyes of the world's peoples. In this sense, world events which are created or manipulated by either command center have as their object the eventual degrading of the opposing command center's moral leadership.

Thus, world events which create division and confusion in an opponent's command center tends to bestow increased moral authority in the other. It is the nature of men to react in this way. In the strategic sense, disharmony within a command center makes the implementation of anything like a global strategy rather difficult if not impossible. This has a cumulative effect over the years, for once the opposing command center's strategy is seen to be more effective, it becomes more prestigious and its moral authority is raised in the eyes of the world's peoples which tends to enable its strategy to be more successfully executed in the future. Success tends to breed success. Under this hypothesis, the moral contest could be won by the command center which most consistently exhibits the moral strength and resolution to conduct a winning strategy.

The command center of the United States is both blessed and cursed at the same time. The Founding Fathers wisely provided for the division of power into the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of the U.S. government to prevent

its abuse. However, for strategic purposes the U.S. command center consists of the Executive and Legislative branches only. These branches must be considered as a whole since realistically there is very little any U.S. Administration can do of a substantive nature without the support of the Congress. The Congress must provide the funds but it does so by addressing itself to programs that support policies, not primarily a clear and coherent global strategy.

Looking at the way the Executive branch has traditionally done things in an environment in which global strategy is not fully appreciated, international efforts are divided into two major and sometimes contradicting administrative categories: foreign policies and defense policies. Foreign policies are commonly assumed to be reflected in the diplomatic functions of the Department of State while defense policies are reflected in the activity of the Department of Defense. This self-perpetuating division into foreign and defense policies at the Executive branch level is duplicated in both Houses of the Congress by distinct foreign and defense related committees. This somewhat arbitrary division of labor makes it difficult for the Executive branch to achieve a coherent synthesis in these two areas, and worse, it tends to allow the vital moral, psychological, social and economic

factors that must be taken into account to fall by the way-side or be relegated to secondary importance.

This is probably why many Americans, both inside and outside the government, seem to believe that the parts of our global efforts do not relate to any coherent whole. What they hear from these two major departmental spokesmen are mostly the result of differing perspectives. But foreign and defense policies are not the only thing they have in mind. Arms control, foreign aid, trade and other policies and programs that combine with foreign and defense matters to form the sum total of our international efforts are involved.

We Americans tend to view things in terms of specific issues that seem to come unexpectedly from over the horizon, cause a flurry of dissention and confusion, and then disappear after a time. We lack a strategic framework by which to properly evaluate these issues. Our elected representatives in the Congress are much like ourselves in this respect. It is why a bipartisan consensus on the more important aspects of our foreign and defense policies has been difficult to maintain in the Congress. In the resulting climate of division and confusion, diverse organized pressure groups use their influence as a fulcrum to leverage the nation's policies toward their direction and interests and ignore the overall interests of the nation as a whole. It is the curse of the U.S. command center.

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THE STRATEGIC STRUCTURE CONCEPT

The National Security Council was established as the apex of U.S. national security affairs by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Note that the key word is security, not strategy. It was envisioned as a sort of supreme defense council in which important foreign and defense policies would be considered. It is headed by the President and its regular members include the Vice-President and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The same Act provides for participation by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Technically, what is represented by those members is only diplomacy, military force and intelligence. This is illustrated on Chart A.

The two principal departments of the Executive branch charged with the execution of most policies of an international nature are the Department of State and the Department of Defense. The Department of State is generally recognized as responsible for foreign policy execution while the Department of Defense is responsible for defense policy. Funding for the activities of these two departments come under the purview of comparable committees in the Senate and House of the Congress. This is illustrated on Chart B. The terms "foreign policy" and

"defense policy" have been assigned to these separate administrative departments by tradition, for strategy has had no administrative significance heretofore.

If these traditional ways of looking at the national security structure of the U.S. government are temporarily set aside and we look at the same structure in strategic terms, there tends to be some clarification in functions of the Departments of State and Defense from the strategic point of view. Such a conception is illustrated on Chart C as a way of indicating that structure follows strategy and not vice versa. Inherent in this is the concept that policy follows strategy. Terms like foreign policies and defense policies would gradually become outmoded by strategic functions as indicated. Thus, the Department of Defense would be charged with the execution of military strategy and the Department of State with negotiation strategy.

Referring to Chart C, there are as yet no departments of the Executive branch that can be assigned functions of economic strategy or communications strategy nor are these two function represented on the National Security Council. However, they are represented to some extent within the staff of the National Security Council.

Chart D represents a concept for the eventual formation of Committees on Strategic Affairs in both houses of the

Congress as a way for the Congress to address the combined effect of foreign and defense policies as a whole. Strategic thinking could be advanced in the process of attaining agreement among the Members of the Congress on the need for such committees.

Once established, these Committees on Strategic Affairs could cause to be devised measures of U.S. strategic effectiveness for their own use and serve much as envisioned by the Bellmon Resolution and the Collins Report as reviewing bodies. If not already done, these committees could, as their initial action, hold hearings on the need for a revision of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and related acts and amendments.

These Committees on Strategic Affairs could serve as a way for the Executive branch to present its broad strategic concepts to the Congress and involve the Congress in strategic decision-making as part of the process for striving to attain a bipartisan consensus on U.S. strategic matters, whether short or long-term. Such Committees could also serve as a natural focal point for those private citizens and organizations that wish to present strategic ideas and concepts for consideration by the U.S. government.

The underlying hypothesis is that a broader understanding of strategic affairs as a guide to specific policies should provide a framework by which the Congress can readily make funding decisions for all U.S. international affairs in a more meaningful way.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
ORGANIZATION

CHART A





CHART B

CURRENT U.S. POLICY ORGANIZATION



STRATEGIC FUNCTIONS CONCEPT





CHART D



\*COMMITTEE CHAIKMEN OF:  
ARMED SERVICES  
FOREIGN RELATIONS  
APPROPRIATIONS  
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS  
BUDGET  
INTELLIGENCE

A PRONOUNCEMENT STRATEGY CONCEPT

This concept involves the realization that the communication of ideas is an essential part of a nation's strategic affairs. It is the only way to achieve a measure of strategic harmony or, in other words, a consensus in support of a nation's global strategic actions. In reality, it is probably the most important sub-strategy of an overall strategy. It is especially important under our system wherein the American electorate as a whole is the final arbiter.

The concept of a carefully crafted pronouncement strategy would have this consensus building as its goal. For this purpose it should be considered basically as a truth campaign.

A sound pronouncement strategy under this concept would entail a description, from the strategic point of view, of where we have been and why and what we need to do in the future. A reiteration by the case history method as indicated in the Strategic Memory Concept section herein is suggested as an example of where we have been. The why would be slightly more complicated. But it could be done by describing the long-standing strategic challenge to the U.S. and its central nature in a manner suggested by SUN TZU.

SUN TZU suggested that a hostile strategy could be rendered less effective by exposing it to common knowledge. While this may not be easy to do, nevertheless most Americans admire and respect those who speak the truth when they hear it. This strategic approach would require the outright acknowledgement that a hostile global strategy has been in existence for some time and it had been successfully employed to our great disadvantage. It would necessitate an accurate and precise in-depth description of that strategy in all of its details. It could become a significant media event if handled properly.

5/31/83  
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SOME MEASURES OF U.S. STRATEGIC EFFECTIVENESS

Since strategy is a way of thinking directly related to the attainment of goals, an important feature of any U.S. strategic package should be a way to measure progress toward those goals. While admittedly this concept has not yet been perfected, it may be helpful to suggest some measures that could be considered in this respect.

1. The U.S. strategy appears to be successful in the eyes of an expanding number of other peoples in the world.
2. There is increasing support over time by the American electorate for the ongoing U.S. strategy.
3. There is increasing sympathy over time by governments of independent nations for the ongoing U.S. strategy.
4. There is increasingly favorable opinion of the U.S. as a result of its strategy among the peoples of the world.

5. The allocation of national resources by the government in support of U.S. strategic affairs is either reduced over time or stabilized at a level that can be sustained without a disruptive effect on the U.S. economy.
6. The U.S. strategy has a clearly visible impact that gradually renders hostile strategies ineffective, so that threats emanating from them are reduced over time.
7. The U.S. strategy operates in a way that gradually reduces the probability of either a nuclear or conventional war of attrition between the U.S. and another major power.
8. The U.S. strategy is such that the actions of those implementing the strategy and the perceptions of observers combine to induce a cumulative effect that renders the strategy easier to accomplish by heightening the willingness of more people to participate in the process over time.